Wage inequality and productivity growth:motivating sticks and crippling carrots by Rogers, Mark & Vernon, Guy
ISSN 1466-1535
WAGE INEQUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: MOTIVATING
CARROTS AND CRIPPLING STICKS
SKOPE Research Paper No.40 SPRING 2002
By Mark Rogers, Harris Manchester College, Oxford and Guy Vernon, SKOPE,
University of Oxford.
ESRC funded Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organisational
PerformanceOxford and Warwick Universities
Editor’s Foreword
SKOPE Publications
This series publishes the work of the members and associates of SKOPE.  A formal
editorial process ensures that standards of quality and objectivity are maintained.
Orders for publications should be addressed to the SKOPE Secretary, SKOPE,
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL.

1Wage inequality and productivity growth: motivating
carrots and crippling sticks
Mark Rogers (Harris Manchester College, Oxford)
and
Guy Vernon (SKOPE, Department of Economics, Oxford).
Absract
Wage inequality is a particular focus of attention not only in public debates over the
need for social regulation to support equity, but those over the implications of social
regulation for productive performance. The present paper employs panel techniques to
examine the comparative historical relationship between wage inequality and hourly
labour productivity growth in the manufacturing sectors of nine advanced
industrialised nations over the period 1970-1995. The results show that whilst greater
inequality in the top half of the wage distribution is associated with greater
productivity growth, greater inequality in the bottom half is associated with lower
productivity growth. It appears that whilst wage inequality in the top half of the
distribution productively motivates higher earners, wage inequality in the bottom half
of the distribution is detrimental for productivity performance. The latter result is
most likely attributable to the weak incentives to reorganise production where
extremely low pay is feasible.
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1. Introduction
There can be few themes more frequently recurring and more central to the advanced
industrialised world than that of the relationship between the organisation of work,
broadly conceived, and production and productivity. One of the startling features of
advanced industrialised economies is the difference in wage dispersion between
countries, as well as the marked historical shifts in dispersion that some countries
have experienced over the last few decades. For example, in 1975 the ratio of the 90th
to 10th percentile gross wage in the US was 3.75, rising to 5 in 1995; for Sweden the
ratio was 2.2 in both 1975 and 1995. These cross-country and temporal differences
might well be expected to have some impact on nations’ productive performance.
Neo-liberalism suggests that although product market pressures may be productive,
management must be left unshackled by social rights or joint regulation in its dealings
with employees. The development of social rights and joint regulation at work is
supposedly detrimental for productivity in large part because wage distributions are
changed, with the subsequent distortion of incentives for both managers and workers.
In contrast, advocates of social regulation often argue that its implications for wage
inequality can have diverse benefits, including that of improving productivity
performance.
This paper confronts this old debate with new data and new techniques, employing the
established framework of productivity growth studies to explore the comparative
historical relationship of wage inequality to the growth in value added per hour
worked in manufacturing in 9 OECD countries over the period 1970 to 1995. The
results indicate that analysing the 90th to 10th percentile – a summary measure of the
entire wage distribution – is of little use in advancing this debate. Rather, variations in
the wage distribution below and above the median have distinct associations with
productivity growth. Moreover, the results suggest that it is not productivity
performance that is driving the wage structure; rather wage structure seems to
‘determine’ productivity growth.
3It might be thought that a focus on wage inequality as a causal influence is profoundly
misguided. Although discussion of the possibility that the wage structure may
influence productivity has a long pedigree, within the more recent economics
literature the focus has largely been on the sense in which the wage structure is
endogenous. The ‘skill biased technical change’ (SBTC) literature might well be
taken to suggest that wage inequality is principally determined by machine embodied
technical change. However, as we show here, this literature does not offer an
explanation of cross-national developments in wage inequality. The current focus on
SBTC exists alongside a longer standing presumption that wage dispersion can be
viewed as the outcome of human capital dispersion. Yet, as we also show here,
detailed recent work shows that cross-national variation in inequality in human capital
plays a remarkably small role in accounting for such cross-national variation in wage
inequality. There is thus no empirical basis for the view that wage inequality is an epi-
phenomenon merely expressing either human capital or physical technology.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two considers the theoretical reasons
why the extent of wage dispersion may have a casual influence on productivity.
Section three outlines the literatures that discuss the determinants of wage dispersion,
with a particular focus the relevance of human capital and skill biased technical
change to comparative historical developments. An empirical test of any link between
wage dispersion and productivity growth requires a framework for productivity
growth, which is defined in section four. The fifth section discusses the empirical
specification and provides an overview of the wage dispersion data. The sixth section
contains the results of the main regression analysis along with an analysis of the
robustness of the results. These results suggest that greater wage inequality above the
median, as measured by the 90/50 ratio, is associated with higher productivity growth,
whilst greater 50/10 inequality is associated with lower growth. The possible
explanations for such an association are discussed in section 7. Section 8 features
some concluding remarks.
42. How might wage inequality affect productivity
growth?
The established theoretical literature on wage determination provides rather little
guidance on the likely implications for comparative historical productivity growth of
variations in wage inequality. It is far from clear what a simple notion of a perfectly
competitive labour market in which factors of production are paid their marginal
revenue products would lead one to expect, even with regard to the level of
productivity (Hibbs and Locking, 2000). A more recent theoretical literature has
firms, or more strictly managers, choosing an optimal wage structure with some
regard to fairness  or cohesiveness (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, Lazear, 1989,
Levine, 1992). If firms, or managers, always decide optimally, however, it appears
difficult to divine any predictions on the cross-national relation between wage
inequality and productivity, still less wage inequality and productivity growth. If there
is any prediction at all, it appears that it is that there will be no relation.
It might simply be thought that wage inequality represents an incentive to work; an
incentive for employees to accommodate themselves to the demands of their
employers in the hope that they might earn more, or avoid earning substantially less.
Similarly, the elementary human capital investment approach appears rather clear cut
in its implications, with Becker (1964) suggesting that a compression of the wage
distribution would reduce the incentives of individual employees or potential
employees to invest in vocational educational and training to develop their human
capital, with possibly detrimental implications for productivity growth.
The simple incentive effect on human capital accumulation, however, is not the only
possible implication of wage inequality. Since compressing the wage distribution is
likely to reduce the number of very low skilled jobs, this may act as a signal to
workers to pursue human capital investment, or face unemployment. Thus, for
example, the introduction of a minimum wage may lead to increased human capital
accumulation (Agell and Lommerud, 1997, Agell, 1999). The extent of wage
inequality may also affect the uncertainty faced by individuals investing in human
capital, such that risk-averse individuals invest less in human capital where wage
inequality is higher as they become less sure of the returns. Moreover, the economic
5growth literature features the notion that credit market imperfections imply difficulties
for low paid individuals making investments in education and training (e.g. Aghion et
al, 1999a).
It has recently been argued that the availability, and low cost of, skilled, or white
collar, labour is complementary to productivity growth. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) analyse the determinants and results of organisation changes in UK and French
workplaces, finding that a higher ratio of skilled to unskilled pay (within workplaces)
is negatively associated with organisational change, which, in turn, has a positive
association with productivity growth. Their interpretation is that “cheap skills are
beneficial to the introduction of organizational change” (p.1474), but they might
equally have concluded that relatively expensive unskilled labour is beneficial. Other
papers studying the relationship between workplace earnings and technology have
found that workplaces with higher average earnings appear to adopt more new
technology (Doms et al, 1997, Chennells and Van Reenen, 1997).
The literature on managerial slack or X-inefficiency (Liebenstein, 1966) also suggests
a mechanism by which wage compression may promote productivity.1 The basic idea
is that wage distributions alter the external pressures that managers are under. The
importance of managerial slack in determining productivity has been highlighted in
the literature on product market competition (Nickell, 1996, Boone, 2001, Ahn,
2002). Aghion et al (1999a, b) incorporate the concept of managerial slack into
endogenous growth models, creating a link between more competition and growth. In
a similar way the extent of wage inequality is another factor that may constrain
managers. The facility of managers to pay (relatively) low wages may reduce the
pressure to introduce new technology or work practices, which would be introduced
were such low pay precluded (i.e. slowing or even preventing the diffusion of ‘best
practice’ techniques or equipment). This argument appears most relevant to wage
dispersion in the lower part of the distribution.
                                                
1 A modern rendering of managerial slack features in principal-agent models in which agents are
assumed to minimise ‘effort’ given remuneration. ‘Effort’ could be associated with reflection on the
organisation of work, the implementation of new technologies, the management of change, the
confrontation of employment relations issues and the like.
6Relatedly, from outside the economics community and discourse, much research
suggests that greater wage inequality may undermine production performance (see
Streeck, 1992; Rogers and Vernon, 2002). Greater wage inequality may not only
allow management a simpler route to profitability than that of nurturing productivity
growth, but lead to the isolation of management. This may bring an ignorance
amongst management of their workforce and its activities, and a dispiritment of lower
paid employees which inhibits their commitment. A nexus of managerial
complacency and workforce resignation in combination with limited employee self-
assurance and a mis-direction of employee effort may result, possibly allied to illness,
with detrimental implications for productivity growth.
Yet wage inequality may also be of relevance to aggregate productivity in a more
straightforward sense. In the 1940s Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner argued that wage
solidarity – equal pay for equal work regardless of the characteristics of the firm –
could raise productivity. Their basic argument was that high wages in low
productivity firms (sectors) could force them to close, transferring resources to high
productivity firms (sectors). Agell and Lommerud (1993) formalised this ‘structural
change’ intuition within an endogenous growth model. The model has two sectors, a
modern sector that drives growth via learning-by-doing and a traditional sector. They
show that reducing wage dispersion may boost growth as it can increase the resources
allocated to the modern sector. Implicit in the model is the idea that the learning-by-
doing represents an externality not internalised by profit-seeking firms. Moene and
Wallerstein (1997) provide another theoretical discussion of the role of wage
dispersion by modelling its impact on firms’ profitability, the entry of new firms and
capital stock. Their model assumes exogenous technical change and suggests that
wage compression can raise profitability, increase the rate of new firm entry and lead
to a more modern capital stock.2
                                                
2 Their model is a vintage capital model in which factor prices determine the longevity of the capital
stock. Salter (1966) provides the seminal analysis. In his book he states “One of the most important
ways by which public policy impinges on this process [structural change promoting increasing
productivity] is through wages policies. Because wages play a major part in inducing such structural
changes, it is particularly desirable that the market for labour should cut across inter-industry
boundaries, thereby ensuring that comparable labour has the same price in expanding and declining
industries.” (p.153 of 1969 paperback edition)
7In summary, there are a number of mechanisms by which wage dispersion may
influence productivity growth. Despite this, to our knowledge, there are no existing
empirical studies of the relation between aggregate measures of wage dispersion and
productivity growth.3 There is, however, substantial comparative historical evidence
that economic growth and income equality are positively correlated, and indeed
particularly strongly amongst advanced industrialised countries (e.g. Persson and
Tabellini, 1994, Benabou, 1996, Aghion et al, 1999a). Forbes (2000), however, has
recently argued, on the basis of particular data and analysis, that whilst it may be the
case that greater equality promotes growth in the long term, shifts towards greater
equality impede growth.4 These growth studies have a different purpose to the present
paper, seeking to deal not only with the implications of income as opposed to wage
inequality, but with the experiences of not only manufacturing (in which the
measurement of output is very much simpler) but private and public services (mostly
                                                
3 There is, of course, an extensive literature on explaining productivity growth in OECD countries,
focusing in particular on the roles of physical and human capital, R&D, government spending and
taxation and trade (see Bassanini et al, 2001, for a recent analysis and review). There had also been
some attempts to relate productivity to labour market institutions in cross-national analyses before
Rogers and Vernon (2002). Nickell and Layard (1999, Table 17) show the results of simple cross-
sectional regressions which explore the relationship between gauges of ‘labour market institutions’ and
productivity growth. The measure of productivity is either GDP per person hour or total factor
productivity, and the analysis spans 20 OECD nations for the years 1976-1992. They find that there is
no relation of their gauge of productivity growth to union density, nor to their gauges of the
coordination and coverage of collective bargaining. They find some evidence of a positive relation
between productivity growth and an employment protection index and, much more weakly, lower total
taxes, but this relation disappears when allowance is made for technological ‘catch-up’. Nickell and
Layard (1999) suggest in this context that ‘unions’ need not reduce productivity, but that this depends
on managerial activity, the nature of industrial relations, and indeed on the character of product
markets. Buchele and Christiansen (1995; 1999) have employed indices of employees’ rights to
conduct simple cross-sectional examinations of their relation to hourly labour productivity growth for
the G7 over 1972-1988, which suggest that there is a (positive) relationship. No controls for other
influences on productivity growth are made.
4 Forbes does not present any results confined to the advanced industrialised world, and, in any event,
those familiar with the seminal Luxembourg Income Study, or indeed of the generality of sources on
inequality and poverty in the OECD, would be astonished by the estimates of overall income inequality
she takes (Forbes, 2000, Table 2) from Deininger and Squire (1996) for these nations; these have, for
example, the UK more equal than Sweden around 1990.
8beyond the OECD), and often disregarding not only working hours but employment
rates and demography. Moreover, in contrast to the current paper, these contributions
employ summary measures of inequality, not exploring, as here, whether the
inequality of the top and bottom half of the distribution may have distinct
consequences.
3. Influences on wage dispersion
Evidently, wage inequality does not fall from the sky. This acknowledgement should
not be taken as an indication of the inappropriateness of a focus on wage inequality,
as it can hardly be argued that any variable is entirely autonomous from the larger
political economy. Yet if it were the case that wage inequality were more or less
exclusively determined by a single well-defined influence it might be quite reasonably
argued that the focus of attention should be this influence. A consideration of the
basis of comparative historical developments in wage inequality is thus of relevance
here.
A human capital perspective would stress the implications of societal arrangements
for schooling, training and human capital formation for wage inequality, whilst
leaving aside the political economic basis of these arrangements. Estevez-Abe et al
(2001) present some diagrammatic indication of an inverse cross-national
comparative relationship between the extent of nations’ provision of vocational
educational and training (VET) and the extent of wage inequality. More specifically,
it has been suggested by Nickell and Layard (1999) that inequality across educational
opportunities may drive much wage inequality. Yet the detailed work of Devroye and
Freeman (2000) on the results of the international adult literacy survey (IALS),
demonstrates that the cross-national variation in the inequality in scores can account
only for a very small proportion of the cross-national variation in the inequality in
wages. It is, rather,  returns to ‘skill’ (literacy), and variation in wage at a given ‘skill’
(literacy) level, which are of most importance to comparative wage inequality. The
presumption that wage inequality simply, or even principally, expresses educational
or human capital inequality is thus contradicted by the available evidence.
Alternatively, it might be thought that wage inequality merely expresses physical
technology. The skill biased technical change (SBTC) suggests that there is a
9technical basis to developments in wage inequality left unaccounted for by
developments in human capital (e.g. Bound and Johnson, 1992, Katz and Murphy,
1992, Katz and Autor, 1999, Brown and Campbell, 2002). Indeed, this literature
might be imagined even to invalidate the current study through its general
demonstration of the determination of not only wage inequality, but perhaps also
productivity, by technical change. The literature thus warrants a detailed examination
here.
SBTC refers to the general idea that increasing demand for the skilled has shifted the
availability, terms and conditions of work further in their favour over the last 20-30
years. In a prominent recent paper, Bresnahan et al (2002, p.340) conceive SBTC as
‘technical progress’ which shifts demand in favour of the skilled, whilst noting that it
‘tends to be something of a residual concept, whose operational meaning is “labour
demand shifts with invisible causes”.’ Attempts to operationalise it as a causal factor
in empirical work have involved the use of various proxies for technical change.
Bresnahan et al’s (2002) conceptualisation of SBTC as encompassing change in each
of ‘IT use’, ‘organization practices’ and indeed ‘products and services’ seeks
explicitly to greatly extend its meaning beyond some notion of physical technology or
machine embodied technical change, blurring a critical issue. Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) seek to distinguish ‘skill biased organisational change’ from SBTC, implicitly
seeking to delimit and thus retain the latter’s meaning.
In empirical practice, as Bresnahan et al (2002) note, the focus has often been on
information technology (IT) as a source of SBTC. More specifically, the focus has
been on the presence of computing equipment, as in Krueger (1993), Autor et al
(1998) and Haskel and Heden (1999). There has also, however, been some work
around the commitment to investment in R&D, treating R&D intensity as an indicator
of embodied technical change (e.g. Berman et al, 1994, Machin, 1996, Machin and
Van Reenen, 1998). It seems clear that if SBTC is to have meaning as an explanatory
concept it must refer to the inherent or intrinsic characteristics of physical
technologies, or machine embodied technical change, to something outside the black
box of the employment relationship; else it is a residual category so vague that it must
‘explain’ everything and will obscure rather than enlighten.
Critically in the current context, it should be underlined that the SBTC literature does
not seek to establish any relationship between the skill bias of machine embodied
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technical change it posits and productivity growth. The view that there is such a
relationship, even at firm or industry level within the borders of the US, let alone
cross-nationally, is thus unsubstantiated. The comparative historical pattern of
productivity growth which is the focus here cannot reasonably be regarded as an
expression of SBTC.
Much else is left unestablished by the SBTC literature, despite the claims made in and
for it. The SBTC literature is littered with suggestions that the relationship between
technical change, or the implementation of new technology, and developments in
wage inequality over the last 20 or 30 years is well established. As a prominent recent
example, Bresnahan et al (2002) suggest that Autor et al (1998) provide a
corroborative review of the evidence of this relationship. Yet whilst Autor et al (1998)
do indeed claim to be addressing not only the relationship between upskilling and the
implementation of new technologies (specifically, computer intensity), but also the
distinct issue of the relationship between this implementation and wage differentials,
their empirical focus is on accounting for shifts in the non-production, or college
educated, employee share of the total wage bill. It is not clear how these data relate to
wage inequality, even if this is conceived as educational wage differentials. Moreover,
their discussion relates solely to the US.
The very limited published work on SBTC that does actually seek to account for wage
inequality uses inter-industry or inter-firm data, particularly for the US (e.g. Brown
and Campbell, 2002).5 Yet, even here the evidence is hardly overwhelming. Card and
Di Nardo (2002, 776) conclude their detailed survey of the US experience by noting
that ‘the evidence linking rising wage inequality to SBTC is surprisingly weak’.
Moreover, such a national focus is quite uninformative about cross-national
comparative developments. It is quite conceivable that whilst technical change may be
of relevance for developments in wage inequality within a particular nation, it may
have little or no relevance to comparative developments, being swamped, or rendered
                                                
5 One prominent study does make some reference to wage inequality, and indeed to experience in many
nations other than the US. Berman et al (1998, Table 2) briefly present data for twelve nations on the
non-production/production wage ratio. The data show marked differences in national experience but
the authors do not seek to explain these via differential SBTC.
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impotent, by other influences.6 A claim for the importance of SBTC must rest on
evidence of a cross-national association between developments in physical technology
and wage inequality.
The seminal comparative study of the SBTC literature is Machin and Van Reenen
(1998).7 This focuses on the shift to non-production from production work in
manufacturing, and on the shift in the share of wage costs accounted for by non-
production employees, rather than on wage inequality per se. The absence of a
comparative relation between recent trends in wage bill shares and those in wage
inequality is apparent, though implicit, even in the passing reference to developments
in non-production-production wage differentials in Machin and Van Reenen (1998). It
is still clearer from a comparison of Machin and Van Reenen’s (1998, Figure I)
summary of change in non-production wage bill shares over 1973-89, with the
development of 90/10 wage inequality detailed by Rueda and Pontusson (2000, Figs 1
and 2) from OECD data. The figures on 90/10 show wage inequality in the US
exploding over this period, with that in the UK growing a little,, whilst those on the
non-production wage bill share show substantially more growth in the UK than the
US. Unfortunately, the figures on 90/10 available on the other three nations featuring
in Machin and Van Reenen (1998) do not extend across 1973-89, but there is certainly
no indication of a general relationship from that data available on these other nations.
Machin and Van Reenan (1998) thus focus on phenomena which bear no apparent
relation to wage inequality.
In summary, the evidence accumulated in the SBTC literature does not establish that
there is a comparative historical relationship between machine embodied technical
change and productivity growth. Perhaps more surprisingly, the literature does not
even establish such a relation between machine embodied technical change and
                                                
6 Even those SBTC studies seeking to account for developments in the demand for skilled labour
(rather than wage inequality) within national borders other than those of the US, generally find a much
weaker and more unstable relation between the company or branch level R&D intensity or deployment
of IT and ‘upskilling’ (Piva and Vivarelli, 2001).
7 Berman et al (1998) is international in its coverage, but does not seek to account for any of the
comparative variations it uncovers via differential SBTC.
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developments in wage inequality. For the most part, moreover, it does not even
purport to account for comparative wage inequality per se. There is thus no empirical
basis for the view that comparative historical patterns of both, or either, productivity
and wage inequality are traceable to skill biases in physical technology.
This is very far from saying that the organisation of work, broadly conceived, is of no
relevance to wage inequality. Political economic, or institutional, factors do affect the
overall wage distribution. Of particular interest, Rueda and Pontusson (2000) analyse
the determinants of wage inequality for 16 advanced industrialised countries, finding
in particular that higher union density, but also more centralised wage setting, higher
government spending and lower female labour force participation are associated with
lower wage inequality.8 It is doubtless the case that each of these variables in turn is
expressive of more fundamental political economic conditions, although it is difficult
to imagine how they might be driven by purely economic factors. All this makes wage
inequality a fascinating focus (see also Freeman, 1988). Yet given the relationships
between wage inequality and other variables, and in particular with the political
economic context and social regulation of employment, it might be thought that wage
dispersion will act as a proxy for another (omitted) well defined casual factor in the
econometric analysis. This suggests an interest in additional robustness tests featuring
the inclusion of such possible factors.
4. Modelling productivity growth
The empirical specification for analysing productivity is derived from a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
βαβα −−
=
1)(ALHKY  0 < α <1   0 < β <1, [1]
where Y is output, K is capital stock, H is human capital and L is (physical) labour
input in hours. A is technology, in the most encompassing sense, referring not only to
embodied technology but to the organisation of work. Let the rate of growth of
labour-augmenting technology equal g (i.e. At=A0egt) and assume that the growth of
                                                
8 Rueda and Pontusson (2000) find no robust relationship to trade, even though they focus in particular
on trade with developing countries; this is perhaps unsurprising.
13
labour hours is equal to n (i.e. Lt=L0ent). While there are alternative specifications,
equation [1] is common in economy-, sector- and firm-level studies of productivity
growth and is regarded as the baseline model.
To derive the rate of growth of output per hour, we can express [1] in terms of output
and capital per hour and differentiate with respect to time, yielding
h
h
k
kg
y
y
•••
++−−= βαβα )1(  , [2]
where y = Y/L, k=K/L and h=H/L  (the dot notation denotes a time derivative). If the
necessary data are available, [2] allows direct econometric estimation of both the
degree of diminishing returns to both types of capital (α, β) and the rate of
technological progress, g . A functional form like [2] is used in calculations of multi-
(or total) factor productivity. Equation [2] is also found in neoclassical growth
regressions, based on the models of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), and popularised
for empirical work by Mankiw et al (1992).
Assuming y, k and h can be measured, the problem with estimating [2] is capturing
technology growth, g. One solution is to use country-level fixed effects, but this
assumes that technology growth can vary across countries but is constant over time (at
least over the period spanned by the data). To the extent that technology growth varies
over time, alternative explanatory variables can be investigated. Specifically, the
technological catch-up literature suggests that the size of the technology gap (with the
lead country) should be an important factor. Assuming the technology gap can be
proxied by the log of the ratio of value added per hour (i.e. ln(yleader/yfollower)), this
leads to the inclusion of lnyt-1 as an explanatory.9 It is clear, however, that additional
                                                
9 Most studies only enter lnyfollower as an explanatory variable, allowing the lnyleader to enter the constant
term of the regression (or time period dummy if a panel estimator). There is, in fact, an alternative
theoretical justification for including lnyt-1 as an explanatory. Mankiw et al (1992) assume that g
(technology growth) is constant across countries and then estimate ‘convergence’ to steady state capital
to labour ratios. Their methodology involves using the log of initial GDP per worker to control for
distance from steady state in a Solow-Swan model. The technological catch-up approach considers g as
varying across countries and uses the log of initial GDP per worker to proxy the technology gap (on the
assumption that the greater the technology gap, ceteris paribus, the higher g and economic growth).
The confusion between these approaches - both have initial log income as explanatory variables -
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variables could be related to technology growth, for example, R&D intensity, the
level of human capital and the nature of the labour market. As is common in the
existing literature on productivity growth, the time varying data are aggregated over 5
year periods.
The arguments above suggest the general specification for estimation is:
it
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where εit is a standard error term, ηi is the time invariant component of country i’s
technology growth and Z is a set of additional variables that capture time varying
aspects of technology growth (independent of the technology gap effect).
Estimating equation [3] requires data on the previously defined variables, but also
variables for Z. The specific focus here is whether wage dispersion is a member of Z.
The various arguments above suggest that either the change or level of wage
dispersion could be important. To see this, note that A in [1] can be interpreted as an
efficiency parameter, hence if the level of wage dispersion (WD) affects efficiency
then ∆WD will be associated with ∆A. If this is the case then since wage dispersion
cannot increase or decrease indefinitely it can have no impact on growth in the long
run.10 Alternatively, and of greater interest in the long run, the level of WD may affect
the growth of A. This possibility is the focus here.
Another important member of Z, with prior empirical support, particularly in
manufacturing, is investment in R&D.11 At the firm-level a number of review articles
(Cohen, 1995, Griliches, 1995, Mohnen, 1992, Nadiri, 1993) suggest a strong link
between R&D and productivity. At the sector and economy level various studies have
included R&D, with the results indicating a positive role (Englander and Gurvey,
                                                                                                                                           
provides a rationale for using [3]. In [3] it is clear that the significance of the coefficient on initial GDP
per worker relates solely to the presence of technology catch-up (see Dowrick and Rogers, 2002).
10 Put another way, wage inequality is likely to be I(0) while A is likely to be I(1).
11 In the current context, lest there is any remaining doubt that wage inequality (and/or productivity)
merely express physical technology, R&D intensity also serves as a control for any supposed SBTC. Of
course, the inclusion of capital accumulation may be expected to capture embodied technical change.
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1994, Park, 1995, Engelbrecht, 1997, Bassanini et al, 2001, Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe, 2001). Equation [3] also suggests that the growth in human capital
should also be included as an explanatory variable (this is often proxied by level of
schooling in the working age population, as training or experience data are
unavailable). However, some have suggested that the level of human capital may be a
member of Z, or that human capital may boost technology transfer from overseas
(Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). There is a substantial debate over the importance of
schooling in GDP per capita growth, with some recent evidence supporting a positive
association in OECD countries (de la Fuente and Domenech, 2001).
A final explanatory variable included is the change in unemployment level. In
analyses of UK productivity since 1980 there has been widespread debate about the
role of major recessions on productivity levels. Specifically, authors note that the
harsh recession in the early 1980s, especially in manufacturing, may have caused
inefficient business to exit (raising the average level of productivity). Equally, at the
firm level the least productive workers may be made redundant first, again raising
average productivity (Oulton, 1995, Eltis and Higham, 1995). Moreover, one might
well imagine that a threat to an establishment’s or firm’s survival might productively
pressure those still working there. While this alone is a strong rationale for including
change in unemployment, there is a further issue in the current context. Some might
argue that differences in wage inequality may affect unemployment; for example a
common slow down in demand may be thought likely to have less impact on
unemployment in countries with relatively more wage inequality. An association
between wage inequality and productivity could then be thought due to the
unemployment implications. For all these reasons the change in unemployment can
also be regarded as a control for short run productivity growth changes associated
with recessions.
5. Empirical specification and data overview
The focus of attention here is the determination of the growth of value added per hour
worked for manufacturing (derived from OECD and national sources). Economy-wide
GDP per worker is avoided since it is affected by the problems of measuring service
and particularly public service productivity (Pilat, 1996), and of variations in a
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nation’s endowment of natural resources (e.g. oil). While some of these issues can in
principle be tackled econometrically, it seems appropriate to focus on manufacturing
where productivity measurement is both less difficult and less expressive of resource
endowments. In addition, measured R&D expenditures appear to more accurately
reflect innovative effort in the manufacturing sector. Multi- or total factor productivity
measures are avoided since they constrain the capital coefficient (in [1]), which can be
estimated directly. Value added per hour, rather than per worker, is chosen since this
removes any bias due to changing hours of work.
The study spans the experience over 1970-95 of nine nations; Canada, Finland,
France, UK, Japan, Norway, Sweden, USA and West Germany. These nations were
selected partly on the grounds of data availability, but also to offer a range of patterns
of social regulation. The data employed in estimation are for 5 year periods. In part
this is to smooth out annual fluctuations in productivity growth and focus on medium
term movements, and for sheer consistency with the existing literatures, but is also
required as some explanatory variables are only available quinquennially. Table 1
below shows the main variables used in the analysis. The data on capital, schooling
and R&D are largely self-explanatory. Note that there are no time series data solely
for schooling stocks in the manufacturing sector, or for that matter for training, hence
the growth in average years of schooling in population over 25 is used.
Table 1 Variables used in analysis
Variable Definition, Source Mean s.d.
Growth in GDP per hour
(manufacturing)
Growth rate over five year period. GDP in 1990
constant PPP US dollars.  OECD (1997)
0.034 0.015
Log of initial GDP per hour,
manufacturing
As above. 2.76 0.30
Growth in capital to labour ratio Growth in ratio over five years.
OECD (International Sectoral Database).
0.045 0.019
Growth in total schooling Growth in average years of schooling in
population over five years.  Barro and Lee (2001).
0.013 0.012
R&D Intensity Business R&D to value added in manufacturing,
averaged over five year period. OECD (1997)
0.051 0.021
Change in unemployment Change in ratio of unemployed to labour force
from one five year period to next.
0.011 0.023
Wage inequality Three distinct measures available based on the
ratio of percentiles in gross wages (males and
females) (OECD database).  Each measure is an
average of five year period.
Log of 90th to 10th percentile 1.093 0.236
Log of 90th to 50th percentile 0.566 0.091
Log of 50th to 10th percentile 0.527 0.166
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Note: More details of the variables are in data appendix.
The data for wage dispersion use the ratios based on the 90th, 50th and 10th percentile,
allowing us to investigate changes in wage distributions above and below the median,
something that may be important given the conceptual issues discussed above. Figures
1 to 3 show time plots of the three wage dispersion measures over time. These
confirm the fact that inter-country differences are large, and also show that there are
substantial inter-temporal changes within countries, implying that panel analysis for
this period has variation on which to estimate coefficients. Rowthorn (1992) stresses
the relation between the various gauges of comparative wage inequality available for
manufacturing and the entire economy.
Figure 1 Time series plot of 90/10 wage inequality
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Figure 2 Time series plot of 90/50 wage inequality
Figure 3 Time series plot of 50/10 wage inequality
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As noted above, the nature of wage dispersion is linked to other features of the
economy. Figure 4 shows plots of the five year averages of 90/10 wage dispersion
measure against similar averages for union density, social security expenditures as a
percentage of GDP, average annual hours and trade openness (exports plus imports
over GDP). Each data point is represented by the country code (see Appendix)
followed by the end year for the averages. The plots confirm the broad expectation
that these variables are linked, although it is clear the relationships are far from
perfect. The first three plots suggest that wage dispersion may be a useful index of
social rights and joint regulation. The last plot shows that increased trade openness is
associated with low wage dispersion, an issue highlighted by Agell (1999).
Figure 4 Wage inequality (90/10) vs. other variables
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6. Regression analysis
The objective of this section is to use regression analysis to investigate the association
between wage inequality and productivity growth. Most recent analyses of
productivity growth use panel data techniques, since these allow the specification to
include a time invariant, country specific effect (the ηi in equation [3]). A fixed effect
estimator could be used, but this can be judged inappropriate due to the (potential)
20
endogeneity of wage dispersion measures and due to the presence of a lagged
dependent variable in [3] (Nickell, 1981).12 One solution is to use a GMM-based,
dynamic panel estimator due to Arellano and Bond (1991), which was initially used in
cross-country growth studies by Caselli et al (1996). Although, the use of dynamic
panel estimators represents ‘best practice’ in the growth literature, there are certain
concerns over dynamic panel estimators, especially for small samples. Given this, the
second sub-section below uses more established techniques – fixed effects and OLS
models – to check the robustness of the findings on wage inequality.
GMM estimation
The GMM dynamic panel estimator removes the fixed effects by first differencing the
data, hence the actual estimation is based on first differences. Lagged values are used
as instruments for the endogenous variables: initial productivity and wage inequality
(where the latter is included). The first column in Table 4 shows the GMM estimation
for the basic model without wage inequality. The regression also includes a set of year
dummies, as required by the catch-up specification (see footnote 7). The coefficient
on initial labour productivity is negative and significant, indicating the presence of a
technological catch-up effect. The coefficients on capital per hour growth, schooling
growth and R&D intensity are all positive but not significant.13 The coefficient on
change in unemployment, an influence neglected in the existing literature, is positive
and significant. The second column introduces wage inequality to the estimation,
adding the log of the ratio of the 90th to 10th wage percentile (log 90/10), with the
results showing the coefficient is not significantly different from zero.
                                                
12 This may not be directly obvious. Note that the growth of labour productivity is (lnyt – lnyt-5)/5, and
the ratio of the initial labour productivities (the catch-up term), both contain lnyt-5. Hence it is possible
to rearrange [3] to yield a standard lagged dependent variable model.
13 The insignificant coefficient on the capital growth is of concern. Further investigation shows the
result is largely due to the inclusion of the R&D intensity variable (omitting this variable results in the
coefficient on capital growth rising to 0.25, with a t-stat of 2.3). This pattern of results – an increase in
magnitude and significance of the capital growth coefficient when other explanators are omitted – is
common to the other regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5. In general, as other explanators are
omitted the coefficient on capital growth rises to between 0.25 and 0.3 (magnitudes more in line with
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The third column distinguishes between top and bottom end wage inequality, entering
both the log of the ratio of 50/10 and 90/50 wage percentiles. The results here are
quite startling; there is a positive and highly significant coefficient on the 90/50 ratio
and a negative and highly significant coefficient on the 50/10 ratio. Testing the
equality of the coefficients we reject the null of equality at the 1% level. The
implication is that wage inequality above and below the median have converse
relationships with productivity growth. Column three also shows that the coefficients
on schooling and R&D are now more significant.
The last two columns of Table 4 check the robustness of the results on wage
inequality by omitting the change in unemployment and the growth in schooling. In
both regressions the coefficient on the log 90/50 shows little change in significance or
magnitude. Column 4 shows the coefficient on the log 50/10 increases in significance
and magnitude if the change in unemployment is omitted. Column 4 also shows that
the exclusion of change in unemployment greatly affects the estimated coefficients on
growth in schooling, R&D intensity and initial productivity. The inclusion of the
change in unemployment variable can, therefore, substantially alter results for
conventional variables. Column 5 shows a specification that omits the growth of
human capital; the coefficient magnitude on the log 50/10 wage inequality falls, but is
still statistically significant at the 5% level.
                                                                                                                                           
traditional estimates). The implication that high rates of investment are correlated with other national
characteristics is, perhaps, to be expected.
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Table 4 Results from GMM regressions using level of log wage inequality
Dependent variable: growth in value added per hour (over 5 year periods)
1 2 3 4 5
Log of initial Labour Productivity -0.076 -0.060 -0.061 -0.047 -0.063
(5.12)*** (6.02)*** (4.37)*** (3.77)*** (4.63)***
Growth in Capital/Labour ratio 0.119 0.176 0.137 0.113 0.162
(1.12) (1.56) (1.45) (1.45) (1.56)
Growth in Total Schooling 0.098 0.016 0.145 0.289
(0.66) (0.10) (1.74) (4.09)***
Business R&D/value added 0.276 0.116 0.533 0.873 0.421
(1.41) (0.84) (1.88)* (4.10)*** (1.66)
Change in Unemployment rate 0.218 0.242 0.214 0.251
(3.32)*** (4.39)*** (2.42)** (3.44)***
Log of 90th/10th Wage 0.020
(0.51)
Log of 50th/10th Wage -0.155 -0.200 -0.122
(3.23)*** (5.75)*** (2.43)**
Log of 90th/50th Wage 0.277 0.277 0.259
(2.89)** (2.33)** (2.99)***
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29 29 29 29 29
Number of group(WBCODE) 9 9 9 9 9
Joint sign. of year dummies (prob) 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Equality of 90/50 and 50/10 (prob) Na Na 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: Regressions shown are based on Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM, first step, robust estimator.
The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions indicates that the GMM instruments are valid; the null
hypotheses of no serial correlation in the errors (which is required for consistency of GMM estimators)
is not rejected. Columns 2 to 5 treat wage inequality measures as endogenous. Estimates were made
using STATA 7.0 Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%.
Fixed effects and OLS estimation
Although the GMM based dynamic panel data estimator is becoming the standard
technique in growth analyses, GMM estimators are known to be unreliable in small
samples. Specifically, there is a concern that coefficients may be biased and test
statistics unreliable, especially when variables are treated as endogenous (Kiviet,
1995, Dornik et al, 2001, Newey and Smith, 2001, Hahn et al, 2001). One alternative
option is to use a fixed effects model. Use of this estimator implies that the coefficient
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on the initial level of productivity will be biased, but this coefficient is not the central
issue here.14
The first column in Table 5 uses the specification from column 3 in Table 4. The
FEIV estimator uses lagged values of log 50/10 and log 90/50 wage inequality as
instruments for the contemporaneous values and the results show no significance on
these variables. Note also that the other results are weak, with only the change in
unemployment showing a significant coefficient. In addition, an F-test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. These results
therefore suggest that the FEIV estimator is inappropriate, yet the signs of the
coefficients on 90/50 and 50/10 are as expected. The second column of Table 5 uses a
basic fixed effect estimator, with no instruments for wage inequality, which allows the
sample size to rise to 39.15 The results show that the significance of the coefficient on
the 90/50 measure has increased and its magnitude has fallen, but otherwise
coefficient magnitudes are little changed. This pattern of results is similar if either the
change in unemployment or growth in schooling is omitted, or even if the sample size
is restricted to 31 as in the FEIV estimator.
Both fixed effect models find that the fixed effects are not significant as a group,
providing support for the use of OLS (as long as year dummies remain included).16
The fourth column of Table 5, therefore, estimates a 2SLS model, treating both wage
dispersion measures as endogenous and using lagged values as instruments. The
results show that the log 90/50 ratio has a positive association with productivity
                                                
14 In general, estimating a fixed effect (FE) model when ηi are present introduces a downward bias in
the coefficient on initial productivity (i.e. the lagged dependent variable); in contrast, the bias on this
coefficient in an OLS estimator will tend to be upwards. The GMM estimator should, in theory,
correctly estimate the coefficient which should be between OLS and FE. Jumping ahead and comparing
the GMM, FE and OLS results on lnyt-1 across Tables 4 and 5, it does appear that OLS has the highest
value (-0.035), with the GMM between -0.05 and -0.08, while the FE results are between -0.06 and -
0.14 (although these estimates are generally not significant).
15 Intuitively, one would expect the sample size to rise by nine – the number of countries in the sample
– as this regression does not use lagged values of wage inequality as instruments. However, the sample
is, in fact, constrained by lack of OECD capital stock data in some cases.
16 A common alternative estimator is a random effects (RE) model. However, with the current data if
one attempts to estimate RE the model degenerates into simple OLS.
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growth and the log 50/10 ratio has a negative association. These results reflect
qualitatively the findings of the GMM-based estimators in Table 4, although the
coefficients for the 2SLS are around half the magnitude of coefficients in Table 4.
The last column of Table 5 checks this result using a basic OLS estimator. Again, the
wage inequality coefficients have similar magnitudes and significances as in the
2SLS, suggesting that endogeneity bias is not severe. These results are again robust to
excluding either the change in unemployment of growth in schooling.
Table 5 FE and OLS regressions
Dependent variable: growth in value added per hour (over 5 year periods)
FEIV FE 2SLS OLS
Log of initial Labour Productivity -0.137 -0.061 -0.043 -0.035
(1.01) (1.77)* (2.73)** (3.23)***
Growth in Capital/Labour ratio -0.082 0.186 -0.138 0.097
(0.28) (1.25) (0.61) (0.93)
Growth in Total Schooling 0.236 0.06 0.15 0.044
(0.87) (0.32) (0.47) (0.16)
Business R&D/value added 0.125 0.419 -0.113 -0.081
(0.15) (1.30) (0.74) (0.56)
Change in Unemployment rate 0.404 0.311 0.394 0.386
(2.15)** (2.48)** (3.58)*** (3.87)***
Log of 50th/10th Wage -0.283 -0.091 -0.072 -0.046
(0.70) (1.17) (3.00)*** (2.67)**
Log of 90th/50th Wage 0.402 0.232 0.103 0.081
(1.46) (1.82)* (2.41)** (2.44)**
Constant 0.297 0.094 0.12 0.097
(0.53) (0.70) (2.85)** (3.37)***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31 39 31 39
Number of countries 9 9 9 9
R-squared 0.54 0.63 0.65 0.63
Test of fixed effects (prob) 0.48 0.28 Na Na
Sign. of year dummies F-test(prob) 0.56 0.63 0.06 0.22
Equality of 90/50 and 50/10 (prob) 0.21 0.07 0.01 0.01
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. The ‘test of fixed effects’ row shows the probability from an F-test of the null
hypothesis of ηi=0 (i.e. insignificance of fixed effects). The FE and FEIV columns report the ‘within’
R-squared value. OLS and 2SLS have robust standard errors.
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Robustness checks
As discussed in section 3, levels of wage dispersion are correlated with various other
political economic characteristics. To further consider the possibility that the results
above are being driven by omitted variables correlated with the wage structure, the
regressions in both Table 4 and Table 5 were re-estimated adding (severally) a) union
density, b) the ratio of social security to GDP, c) hours of work, and d) trade openness
(X+M/GDP). In summary, the overall pattern of results for the wage dispersion
variables are little changed by the addition of each of these variables; the associations
found above are robust.17
There might be concern over the inclusion of the change in unemployment variable in
the regressions as this is unknown in such analyses, although it is well justified here.
Table 4 has shown the implications of the omission of the change in unemployment
from the GMM-based estimations. Similarly, omitting the change in unemployment
from the regressions shown in Table 5 yields results for wage inequality little
different, though those for other variables are affected. A further concern might be the
lack of significance of the coefficient on the growth of schooling. However, the poor
results on schooling is a feature of the literature.18
                                                
17 There are, however, some insights from these results. Concerning union density, its coefficient is
only conventionally (5% level) significant (and positive) in the OLS/IV estimations, and only then
when 90/50 and 50/10 are also included as explanators. If trade openness is added to the baseline
GMM model in Table 4 it has a negative and significant coefficient, but once the wage dispersion
variables are included the coefficient on trade is never significant. For the social security ratio and the
hours variables the coefficients are positive but never significant at the 5% level, and the coefficients
on the wage dispersion variables are little changed from those in Table 4 and 5. See Rogers and Vernon
(2002) for further early results on the relationships between social rights and joint regulation and
productivity growth.
18 Prichett (2001) provides a widely cited study finding no significance for schooling growth in cross
sectional analysis. Krueger and Lindahl (2000) discuss the robustness of this finding with respect to
OECD, concluding in particular that measurement error may attenuate coefficients. Further regressions
were run to investigate robustness, including using 1) secondary schooling 2) using changes in stocks
not growth rates and 3) initial levels of schooling. Overall, there was no indication that aggregate
schooling stocks can explain manufacturing productivity growth. Equally, exclusion of the growth of
schooling had little effect on other coefficients.
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Lastly, there is always a concern that a few, influential observations are driving the
key results in a regression analysis. To investigate this Figures 5 and 6 below show
added variable (or leverage) plots for the fixed effect model (Table 5, column 2) and
the OLS (Table 5, column 4). In both cases the plots for (conditional) log 90/50 and
log 50/10 are shown. The graphs do show a spread of observations around the
regression line. Figure 5 indicates that the United Kingdom has had relatively large
(conditional) changes in wage inequality and growth. However, omitting the UK from
the FE estimation does, in fact, raise the significance of the 90/50 and 50/10
coefficients (although neither are significant at the 10% level). The plot of
E(growth|X) against E(50/10|X) in Figure 5 also indicates that Canada (1970-75) is an
influential variable, but omitting this observation, or Canada altogether, does not
greatly influence the results reported above. For the OLS results, and the leverage
plots shown in Figure 6, there appear to be no strong influential observations.
Checking the results by omitting each country in turn and re-estimating the model
shows that the coefficients on 90/50 and 50/10 are almost always of the same sign and
significant at the 10% level, although the magnitudes of the coefficients do vary (the
only exception is the coefficient on 90/50 when Norway is omitted, which is
significant at the 13% level). Overall, therefore, there is little indication that a few
influential observations are driving the results on wage inequality. In this respect, as
in others, the results are remarkably robust.
Figure 5 Added variable plots for fixed effect regression
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Figure 6 Added variable plots for OLS regression
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7. Discussion
The basic thrust of the empirical results is as follows. The 90/10 wage dispersion ratio
has no significant association with productivity growth. In contrast, higher wage
inequality above the median is associated with a higher productivity growth rate,
while higher wage inequality below the median is associated with a lower
productivity growth rate. This pattern of results is common to the GMM-first
differenced and OLS/2SLS estimators, but is weaker in the fixed effects estimations.
Furthermore, the results were checked for robustness by a) included variables for
union density, social security, trade openness and hours of work as explanatory
variables, b) omitting the change in unemployment as an explanatory variable and c)
an analysis of influential observations.
A further issue concerns the economic significance, or size, of the coefficients. The
magnitude of the coefficient on the log 90/50 ratio is around 0.25 (in GMM
regressions), hence a one standard deviation increase in log 90/50 (equal to 0.09) is
associated with a 2.3% increase in the productivity growth rate. The magnitude of the
coefficient on the log 50/10 ratio (say around -0.1) suggests a one standard deviation
(0.17) fall in inequality below the median is associated with a 1.7% rise in
productivity growth. These are remarkable magnitudes.
There is, therefore, evidence of significant and important associations between the
shape of the wage structure and productivity growth. What might explain this
remarkable association? Section 2 provided three potential mechanisms whereby the
distribution of wages could influence productivity growth: human capital
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accumulation, pressure on managers and structural change. A discriminating test of
the relevance of each of these mechanisms would require a great deal of further
analysis using a wider variety of data. However, it is illuminating to consider the
correspondence of these mechanisms with the above results.
There is a strong presumption in economics that human capital accumulation is
central to productivity growth, although there is a great deal of controversy about the
specific mechanisms and the measurement of human capital. While the regression
finds no significant results for the growth of secondary schooling, this variable is
defined at the economy level and might thus and otherwise be thought a poor proxy
for actual human capital in the work force. We have also argued that wage inequality
cannot be viewed as an expression of the prevailing inequality of human capital or of
machine embodied technology. Yet the nature of wage inequality may be an
important factor influencing individual and firm-level investments in skills.
The discussion in section 2 noted that wage dispersion could affect the incentives to
accumulate human capital. First, higher wage inequality may increase the incentives
of employees to invest in skills; a simple incentive effect. Second, there is an
opposing effect if (risk averse) employees perceive lower wage inequality as reducing
the uncertainty over the return to skills, or regard a compression of wage inequality
below the median as increasing the probability of unemployment without training.
These mechanisms can offer an account of the results reported above. The role of
lower uncertainty and fear of unemployment may dominate workers’ actions facing
below median wages, whereas the incentive effect may dominate for workers’ facing
above median wages.
Yet the relevance to the results of individual human capital accumulation is subject to
important caveats. Although some training episodes of relevance to productivity
growth may be of short duration, and deliver rapid results, generally the implications
for productivity growth of educational and training decisions might be expected to
occur over rather longer time periods than the five year periods under consideration
here. There must also be some doubt about why the human capital investment
reactions of those earning above and below the median to wage inequality should be
so different. Moreover, all these arguments are presented in terms of the (actual or
potential) employee’s decisions, neglecting the role of the employer.
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Might the results then be interpreted in terms of the pressure on managers to
reorganise work? It is quite possible that when managers are (relatively) free to pay
low wages, they need pay less attention to upgrading not only training but work
organisation. In other words, assuming that organisational change requires effort that
managers wish to avoid, greater wage inequality across lower paid jobs allows greater
managerial slack. This is consistent with the notion that relatively cheap skills
promote productivity. Conversely, it is also possible that higher wage inequality
above the median also places more pressure on managers to reorganise. Thus, greater
90/50 inequality prevents managers paying (relatively) low wages to better paid and
qualified employees, forcing managers to upgrade the organisation of their work.
The central economic justification for wage compression in Sweden in the 1940s was
the Rehn-Meidner argument that wage compression from the bottom up could
increase the rate of structural change. Poorly performing establishments, firms and
industrial branches would have to exit more rapidly if not able to survive by paying
low wages. Whilst this argument suggests the level of productivity should make a step
increase, during the transition to the new productivity level growth rates would also
be higher, and this transition period could of course last many years.19 In addition, if
there are positive (growth) externalities from having more resources in better
performing, perhaps sunrise, firms and industries, the growth rate of productivity may
increase indefinitely. The results on the 50/10 wage inequality measure are quite
consistent with such a view.
The results demonstrate the importance of change in unemployment as an explanatory
variable in growth regressions, something new to the empirical literature. The positive
coefficient on the change in unemployment indicates that severe recessions are
associated with an immediate rise in productivity growth. Such a phenomenon is not
confined to the UK in the early 1980s, but occurred also in Sweden and, most
dramatically, Finland in the early 1990s. This can be seen as the result of a
combination of a batting average effect and the productive results of pressure applied
to the remaining establishments. Given the results on bottom end wage inequality, this
latter possibility seems best interpreted as relating to the productive pressure applied
                                                
19 Hibss and Locking (2000) feature evidence for post-war Sweden on levels of productivity and inter-
and within- firm and industry variation in wages.
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to remaining organisational coalitions in their entirety in such difficult operating
conditions, rather than simply to a disciplining effect on non-managerial or manual
employees alone.
Lastly, the results for R&D are also of interest. Overall, the coefficient on R&D
intensity is only positive and significant in the first difference (GMM) regressions and
when both the 90/50 and 50/10 wage inequality measures are included as explanatory
variables. This suggests that the effectiveness of R&D may be interlinked with the
economy-wide structure of employee relations, human capital accumulation,
managerial incentives and structural change.20 Similarly, Machin and Van Reenen
(1998) note how R&D intensity and skills are complementary, with the strength of
this association varying across countries. It seems that more attention should be given
to R&D and labour markets.
8. Conclusions
This paper analyses whether wage dispersion has an influence on manufacturing
productivity growth in 9 OECD countries over the period 1970-1995. This represents
a new direction for productivity studies of advanced countries. Given that wage
dispersion varies dramatically across countries and also through time, and that the
core of neoclassical economics concerns the role of relative prices, some investigation
is warranted. Though there are no clear predictions in this context from the
conventional body of economic theory, there exist a range of theoretical arguments as
to how wage dispersion may affect the organisation of work and thus productivity
growth. These relate variously to the rate of structural change, managerial slack, the
nature of the employment relationship, the relative cost of skills and human capital
investment.
Of course, the wage inequality characteristic of a nation at a particular time is not
exogenous to the larger political economy. It is an element of the societal organisation
                                                
20 Although there is no existing empirical literature directly on this issue, there is empirical work that
stresses the effectiveness of R&D varies across firm size, funding source and ownership structure (see
Symeonidis, 1995, for a summary), and a more case study-based literature on the role of management,
culture and employee skills (see Nijhof et al, 2002, for a recent discussion).
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of work. This paper has, however, shown that the available evidence does not justify
the views that comparative wage inequality can be accounted for by skill biased
technical change or by inequality in the distribution of human capital. Wage
inequality is, however, strongly related to simple gauges of the social regulation of
employment such as union density. Yet wage inequality is not reducible to a single, or
even small number, of simple well-defined variables and is in this sense a proper
focus for causal econometric analysis.
The paper’s central finding is that higher wage dispersion above the median (90/50
ratio) is associated with higher rates of productivity growth whilst, in contrast, higher
wage dispersion below the median (50/10) is associated with lower rates of
productivity growth. It is clear that although some simple, plausible, mechanisms do
not appear consistent with the above results, this leaves a range of mechanisms which
are. Wage inequality in the top half of the distribution promotes productivity,
apparently not only by encouraging better paid, or more ambitious, employees and
potential employees, to invest in vocational education and training, but also by
encouraging them to meet the more immediate demands of their employers. In
contrast, lower wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution nurtures
productivity growth, apparently not only by (conversely) encouraging investment in
vocational education and training within this range of ambition, but through its
implications of upgrading in the organisation of work, and its facilitation of structural
change.
Considering the immediate policy implications of these results in isolation, the
suggestion is that the ‘optimal’ wage structure would feature half the employed at the
median wage, and half at a wage tending to infinity. This is an obvious absurdity as a
policy prescription. No econometric investigation should be used so crudely as a
guide to, even generalised, policy. Moreover, at least with regard to wage inequality
there are particular considerations of the means by which policy might be pursued.
The likely implications of policy to reshape the wage structure for other aspects of
social regulation which may have implications for productivity growth require
attention (see Rogers and Vernon, 2002). Superficially, though, it appears that a
minimum wage provides one means by which government may seek to reduce bottom
end inequality without reducing that at the top. It appears more difficult to extend top
end inequality without this bringing an extension also at the bottom.
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Data Appendix
Further description of variables
Variable Definition, Source
Initial GDP per hour,
manufacturing
GDP in 1990 constant PPP US dollars. Employment collated from
OECD (1997) sources, and average annual hours from various
sources, including national (see Vernon, 2000).
Growth in capital to labour ratio Data on gross capital stock (1990, constant US$ PPP). Gross capital
stock refers to the cumulative flow of volume investments, corrected
for retirement. In the gross stock, assets are treated as new until they
are retired: it is assumed that they retain their full productive
capacity until removed from the stock. Employment and hours data
as above. Source: OECD (International Sectoral Database).
Growth in total schooling Average years of schooling in population (age 25 plus). Source:
Barro and Lee (2001).
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
Change in unemployment Change in ratio of unemployed to labour force (standardised rate)
from average in one five year period to the next. Source: OECD
(1997)
R&D Intensity Business R&D in manufacturing to value added in manufacturing,
averaged over five year period.
Source: OECD, Basic Science Indicators (1997)
Union density Active union density averaged over five year period; membership
from various sources (see Vernon, 2000).
Social security Share of social spending in GDP, OECD sources (see Vernon,
2000).
Wage inequality Data used by Rueda and Pontusson (2000), supplied to them by
OECD. Based on gross (net for France) earnings of full-time
employees (all employees for Norway). No adjustments for unearned
income, taxation, transfers or household size.
Summary statistics
Country Code Obs Initial Last Means Time
Year year growth 90/10 90/50 50/10
Canada CAN 5 1965 1995 0.030 4.13 1.81 2.28 A
Finland FIN 4 1975 1995 0.057 2.48 1.68 1.47 A
France FRA 5 1970 1995 0.036 3.29 1.97 1.67 A
UK GBR 5 1970 1995 0.032 3.22 1.78 1.82 W
Japan JPN 5 1970 1995 0.039 3.08 1.80 1.71 M
Norway NOR 3 1975 1990 0.026 2.10 1.48 1.41 H
Sweden SWE 5 1970 1995 0.034 2.10 1.57 1.34 A
USA USA 4 1970 1990 0.021 3.93 2.00 1.96 W
W. Germany WGR 3 1980 1995 0.025 2.84 1.72 1.65 M
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Notes: the ‘Time’ column indicates over which period wage inequality data are based on (A=annual
earnings, M=monthly, W=weekly, H=hourly)
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